Probability Semantics for Aristotelian Syllogisms

We present a coherence-based probability semantics for (categorical) Aristotelian syllogisms. For framing the Aristotelian syllogisms as probabilistic inferences, we interpret basic syllogistic sentence types A, E, I, O by suitable precise and imprecise conditional probability assessments. Then, we define validity of probabilistic inferences and probabilistic notions of the existential import which is required, for the validity of the syllogisms. Based on a generalization of de Finetti's fundamental theorem to conditional probability, we investigate the coherent probability propagation rules of argument forms of the syllogistic Figures I, II, and III, respectively. These results allow to show, for all three Figures, that each traditionally valid syllogism is also valid in our coherence-based probability semantics. Moreover, we interpret the basic syllogistic sentence types by suitable defaults and negated defaults. Thereby, we build a knowledge bridge from our probability semantics of Aristotelian syllogisms to nonmonotonic reasoning. Finally, we show how the proposed semantics can be used to analyze syllogisms involving generalized quantifiers

Connexive Logic, Probabilistic Default Reasoning, and Compound Conditionals

We present two approaches to investigate the validity of connexive principles and related formulas and properties within coherence-based probability logic. Connexive logic emerged from the intuition that conditionals of the form if not-A, then A, should not hold, since the conditional’s antecedent not-A contradicts its consequent A. Our approaches cover this intuition by observing that the only coherent probability assessment on the conditional event A | not-A is p(A | not-A) = 0. In the first approach we investigate connexive principles within coherence-based probabilistic default reasoning, by interpreting defaults and negated defaults in terms of suitable probabilistic constraints on conditional events. In the second approach we study connexivity within the coherence framework of compound conditionals, by interpreting connexive principles in terms of suitable conditional random quantities. After developing notions of validity in each approach, we analyze the following connexive principles: Aristotle’s theses, Aristotle’s Second Thesis, Abelard’s First Principle, and Boethius’ theses. We also deepen and generalize some principles and investigate further properties related to connexive logic (like non-symmetry). Both approaches satisfy minimal requirements for a connexive logic. Finally, we compare both approaches conceptually

Probabilistic entailment and iterated conditionals

In this paper we exploit the notions of conjoined and iterated conditionals, which are defined in the setting of coherence by means of suitable conditional random quantities with values in the interval $[0,1]$. We examine the iterated conditional $(B|K)|(A|H)$, by showing that $A|H$ p-entails $B|K$ if and only if $(B|K)|(A|H) = 1$. Then, we show that a p-consistent family $\mathcal{F}=\{E_1|H_1,E_2|H_2\}$ p-entails a conditional event $E_3|H_3$ if and only if $E_3|H_3=1$, or $(E_3|H_3)|QC(\mathcal{S})=1$ for some nonempty subset $\mathcal{S}$ of $\mathcal{F}$, where $QC(\mathcal{S})$ is the quasi conjunction of the conditional events in $\mathcal{S}$. Then, we examine the inference rules $And$, $Cut$, $Cautious$ $Monotonicity$, and $Or$ of System~P and other well known inference rules ($Modus$ $Ponens$, $Modus$ $Tollens$, $Bayes$). We also show that $QC(\mathcal{F})|\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{F})=1$, where $\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{F})$ is the conjunction of the conditional events in $\mathcal{F}$. We characterize p-entailment by showing that $\mathcal{F}$ p-entails $E_3|H_3$ if and only if $(E_3|H_3)|\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{F})=1$. Finally, we examine \emph{Denial of the antecedent} and \emph{Affirmation of the consequent}, where the p-entailment of $(E_3|H_3)$ from $\mathcal{F}$ does not hold, by showing that $(E_3|H_3)|\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{F})\neq1.

Reasoning About Uncertain Conditionals

There is a long tradition in formal epistemology and in the psychology of reasoning to investigate indicative conditionals. In psychology, the propositional calculus was taken for granted to be the normative standard of reference. Experimental tasks, evaluation of the participants’ responses and psychological model building, were inspired by the semantics of the material conditional. Recent empirical work on indicative conditionals focuses on uncertainty. Consequently, the normative standard of reference has changed. I argue why neither logic nor standard probability theory provide appropriate rationality norms for uncertain conditionals. I advocate coherence based probability logic as an appropriate framework for investigating uncertain conditionals. Detailed proofs of the probabilistic non-informativeness of a paradox of the material conditional illustrate the approach from a formal point of view. I survey selected data on human reasoning about uncertain conditionals which additionally support the plausibility of the approach from an empirical point of vie

Experimental Philosophy of Connexivity

While Classical Logic (CL) used to be the gold standard for evaluating the rationality of human reasoning, certain non-theorems of CL—like Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses—appear intuitively rational and plausible. Connexive logics have been developed to capture the underlying intuition that conditionals whose antecedents contradict their consequents, should be false. We present results of two experiments (total n = 72), the first to investigate connexive principles and related formulae systematically. Our data suggest that connexive logics provide more plausible rationality frameworks for human reasoning compared to CL. Moreover, we experimentally investigate two approaches for validating connexive principles within the framework of coherence-based probability logic (Pfeifer & Sanfilippo, 2021). Overall, we observed good agreement between our predictions and the data, but especially for Approach 2